S-300W/WM Land based
antiaircraft-
antimissile system p.I
By Tomasz Szulc
Translated by Hu Di
The beginning of the 50's was the period of intensive
missile technology development, including nuclear ground-ground missiles. The
implementation of such weapons by superpowers caused a new strategically
situation: even a single blow of tactical missile in areas of infantry
concentration, main crossroads could change the outcome of the entire
operation. Therefore the number of conventional arms becomes increasingly
insignificant and as the amount of possessed nuclear weapon grew, the number of
warheads required to conduct a successful strike also inflated. In the 60's, operations on the
level of army (a belt of 100km wide) required the usage of about 50 warheads
from each side. As the result both sides were seeking both active and passive
mediums to minimize the effectiveness of enemy nuclear attacks. It was
relatively easy to engage nuclear weapons carried by bomber by deploying
fighter planes. However it was much more difficult to engage tactical missiles
which were increasingly popular (in the second half of 60's Russians predicted
that USA possessed over 25000 missiles with ranges from 50 to 1000, from which
800 were equipped with separating warlords). The only hope seemed to be
destroying them before launch.
In the middle of 50' the idea of
engaging missiles with anti-missile systems appeared. The most promising
projects were those conducted by Russian scientists G. Kusunko (detection,
tracking and guiding systems) and P. Gruszyn (missiles). The objective of the
scientist was to create an anti-missiles system to protect
However in
System Krug had several significant draw-backs even with the upgraded
missiles. Its range was barely sufficient to intercept tactical missiles, but
the main weakness of the system was that it operated on one channel – one division
could only engage one target at a time. In case of comparably slow aircrafts it
was important as the high speed and its range allowed it to attack several
successive targets before they reach the protected area. However in case of
rockets there is simply insufficient time. For future universal anti-air
missiles, the army required 2 different missiles: the smaller (type B) with a
range of 50 km and a mass up to 300kg and a larger (type A) with a range of 150
km and a mass of 3000kg. The first would engage aircrafts and tactical missiles
with range of about 150 km and comparably flat trajectory, the second was
intended to defeat tactical-operational and air-ground missiles like AM-69
SRAM. Both systems were required to have multi channel and capable of detecting,
tracking targets with size of missile warhead. High mobility and exceptionally
short reaction time (10-15s) were also demanded.
Decades later it appeared that such requirements were
very accurate. However in the 60’s these requirement were virtually
unfeasible. As the result, the requirements were degraded for 9M39 Buk, which theoretically could serve as
the “B type” anti-air missile defense system. However the army needed such
system immediately, so the Kub only
needed to be capable of engaging aircrafts.
In 1965, a program code named Prizma was initialized to define the technical requirements for a
universal antiaircraft-antimissile complex. The task was assigned to NII-20
under the supervision of W. Swistow. His concept foreseen the creation of a
multichannel (2-3) complex with 2 types of rockets: one was to be equipped with
combined (semiactive - radio commanded) guiding system with a mass of 5 to 7
tons, intended to combat ballistic missiles and the second with a mass of 3 ton
for engaging aircrafts. This was to realize the proposals of NIR Binom. Innovative element of Prizma was the employment of the
detection and tracking radar with wall shaped antenna. Meanwhile, modernization
of Krug system was continued to
achieve the antimissile capability and the A. Potapow team were designing a new
stream(?) engine with better parameters. Further development of Prizma was halted when A³maz company which was developing
rocket systems for the army proposed the creation of a multi-channel S-500U
complex, with a range of 70 km. It was proposed as universal for the army and
navy, but only the army demanded antimissile capability. Preliminary analysis
showed that it was impossible to achieve this objective with A³maz’s missiles,
but the company did not want to restart the program. Therefore the decision of
initiating the program was preceded by tempestuous debates, as the result in
the resolution of Counsel of Ministers from 27th of may 1969, there
was a separate directive for missiles and radar systems for the army, though
the code remained as S-300. The development of antiair-antimissile version
under the name of S-300W was assigned to NIEMI (ex NII-20) directed by
Wieniamin Jefremow. The main constructor of the new system was Jefremow
himself.
At the beginning it was supposed that the main problem
was to assure multi-channel. Two configuration was taken under consideration:
one multi-channel tracking and guiding radar or provide as many radars as
channels. The first solution was more ambitious, the second seemed to be easier
to achieve. Finally an intermediate solution was created: each battery will
have one multi-channel detection and tracking radar, guidance was provided by
smaller radars installed on each launch vehicle. For a very peculiar reason the
constructors resigned later from the possibility of employing the tracking
radar to transmit control signals and TVM guiding method, which is utilizing
the missile’s active radar to inform the guidance center the target location.
Such approach was intended to assure the shortest command transmission time to
achieve maximum velocity for the missiles, which was critical in case of fast
targets. Yet TVM method and the employment of an single radar causes that it
guides every missile sequentially and exchanges data with other missiles, which
slows the process of transmitting steering control signals.
The chosen guiding procedure on target is as follow.
In the inertial-command guiding stage, using the tracking radar, the firing
battery defines the trajectory to the target, whose coordinates and optimal
trajectory is inputted to the missile computer 15 s before launch. After
launch, the rocket, guided by a high-precision inertial system follows the
given trajectory. In case the target performs violent maneuvers, the guiding
system transmits the new coordinate by launch vehicle’s radar emitting a wide
beam of signal from the tube antenna. After closing up to the target, the
launch vehicle switches to the parabolic antenna generating a beam with a power
of 10-12 kW and activates the missile’s semi-active self-guiding system which
reacts on the reflected radar signals (adequately coded to avoid errors when
engaging several, closely situated objects). It is activated about 10s before
interception of non-maneuvering targets (when the missile is guided inertially)
or 3s before striking the target (after inertial-command guidance). The
sensitivity of the missile’s guiding radar is sufficient to perceive the echo
from a target with a surface of 0.05m² 30 km away. Depending on the type
of target programmed, the missile directs to its forepart (when engaging
missiles) or to the central point (in case of aircrafts).
The warhead of the rocket is quite innovative. Its
weights 150kg and explodes directionally. The convenience of such warhead was
proved earlier and was used in simplified forms in comparably old missile
systems like S-75, but they generate a cone of shrapnel forwardly. The
constructors of new rockets acknowledged that a cone of shrapnel with a angle
of 60° directed to the side would be more effective, and before encountering
the target, the rocket could simply rotate against its axis in such way to
direct the shrapnel of high density and mass (15g each). Thus the effectiveness
of the massive warhead rose fundamentally.
Later it became clear that the rockets designed after
the supervision of L. Luliew in PKB-8 (later renamed as SMKB Nowator, well
known from the creation of 3M8) were perturbed by many problems. Due to the
large mass, the missiles were designed to be launched vertically to avoid the
need of heavy equipments required to set the azimuth and vertical angle of the
rockets. Back then, such solution was quite startling and rarely used (for
other reasons) in several heavy anti-air complexes. To guarantee the capability
of engaging low-flying targets, it required to guide the missiles downward
after launch (!) while assuring the on-board apparatuses high resistance to
G-force of over 20G. Luckily the dead zone for the low-flying targets was not
limited in the official requirements therefore its large radius - 6km was not
disturbing. The main steering elements of the guidance system are 4 movable
nozzles of the main engine which divert part of the exhaustion gas. Aerodynamic
steers are also employed in the form of 8 foldable stabilizers at the end of
the fuselage, to improve the maneuverability.
In complete contradiction with the maneuverability
requirements, there was also the necessity to reach high maximum velocity,
indispensable to combat fast targets like ballistic missiles. It was known that
with sufficiently powerful engines required velocity can be achieved; however
then it is difficult to guarantee the planned range (mass of the fuel does not
grow linearly with velocity, which leads to infinite starting mass). First airborne
trials of the rocket which configuration was close to the S-500 proved that it
could not withstand the G-force generate in flight. After numerous trials the
shape of the missile was changed in to the “bearing (?) cone” scheme (the same
was chosen by Americans for Sprint and later Israelis for their Hetz). The
velocity of 1700 m/s (Mach 5) was considered satisfying for combating
aerodynamic targets and short ranged ground-ground missiles and 2400 m/s for
intercepting tactical ballistic missiles (Mach 7). Average speeds at full range
were to be 1200 and 1800 m/s correspondingly. Such high speed lead to an
unprecedented phenomena – as the result of air resistance, edges of stabilizers
were heated close to melting point and were submitted to rapid erosion, during
the first trials almost 1/3 of their area were “burned” which lead to loss of
control.
Due to the high priority of the program in the late
70’s and the hope that the designed system is capable of intercepting American
Pershings, the project was continued despite of the difficulties. It was clear
then, that the missiles would be stored, transported and fired from reusable
cylindrical containers. This caused the necessity to install a reliable
pyrotechnic gas-generator, which would propel the missile form the container to
60 m and introducing a minimal interval before firing the start engine to avoid
damaging the launcher. When this appeared insufficient, a small horizontal
impulse was added, which deviates the axis of the missile before starting the engine,
so the main engine nozzle does not aim at the launcher.
The mass of the designed missiles was so large, that
constructors from the very beginning decided that the carrier of the new system
should be tracked vehicle. The “product 830” constructed in the late 70s under
supervision of N. Popow and A. Karabinow in KB-3 of Leningrad (presently AO
Specmasz) was chosen. It was made from the traction system of T-80 with a 555kW
A-24-1 diesel engine (a version of W-46-6 from T-72). Externally, it was
similar to the carrier of self-propelled 2S7 Pion canon and won the competition with the universal carrier MT-T
based on T-64, offered by Malyszew plant from Charkow, (which was not totally
wasted, since, apart from the basic version, it served as heavy artillery hauler,
produced in 1979-92, also as base for BAT-2, MDK-3 and other engineering
machineries). The usage of large transporters capable of lifting 20 t was very
convenient for the constructors. In GKBKM – State Turbine Industry Constuction
Bureau, under the supervision of A. Jaskin the transloader and launchers were
designed smoothly. The tracking radar and command post were also constructed
easily in NIEMI. The production of missiles, launchers and transloaders began
in Kalinin Machine Plant in Swierdlowsk (currently Jekaterinburg) where as
command posts and guidance radar in NPO Marijskij Maszynostroitielnyj Zawod in
Joszkar Ola.
Up to 4 missile containers and command transmission
and target highlighting (?) radar were successfully installed on 9A83 launcher.
To guarantee effective guidance to low-flying targets in uneven landscape, the
radar antenna is located on a hydraulically folded mast 7.5m high, which folded
under the missile containers with the antenna in the back and facing ground
while moving. In combat position, the antenna in lifted 10 m above ground and
is ratable in 360°. After taking up positions, which must be prepared, the
missile container providers are first raised into vertical position by a pair
of hydraulic jacks, then lowered along the provider to the ground. Before
launch the upper cover of the container opens, the launch is initialized by a
solid fuel gas generator, projecting the missile some meters above the launch
vehicle, and then the main engine is fired. The containers can be dumped after
launch or reloaded after inspection in the transport vehicle.
Increased intensity of fire was attained by creating
the possibility of firing the missiles from containers carried on the
transloaders, which gained the name reloading-firing vehicles (PZU) 9A85. For
such purpose, they are provided with a crane (lifting 6350 kg) and container
provider which can be lifted into vertical position. Before combat utilization,
they are parked in direct vicinity of the laucher (PU) 9A83 and connected to it
via cable. In practice the missiles from PZUs are first fired, then from PUs,
while PZUs load from transport vehicles 9T85, adapted civilian transport,
transport packets MS160.01 or from ground. 9A83 launcher are reloaded after
repelling the attack, which lasts about 50 min.
Large dimensions and mass of the launch containers
complicate their handling and transport, but for the “Great Army of The Great
Empire” (such description was used by W. Jefremow in dialogue with the author)
this was not a problem. More important was the parameters of the missiles,
incomparably better than all existing systems available then.
